Application of Economic Concepts on Religious Behavior by Esa Mangeloja




This survey gathers the current state of research activity on the
emerging economic sub-area Economics of Religion. The religious be-
liefs and activities are analyzed from the viewpoint of economic theory
and behavior. The advanced statistical tools and theoretical formula-
tions of economic science can be applied to various problems of reli-
gious activity, dogma and social context. Analysis of interrelationship
between economic and religious behavior increases our understanding
of the nature and behavior of the target subject of economic science
scrutiny, homo economicus.
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11 Introduction
The history of economic analysis of religion can be traced at least back
to Adam Smith (Tribe 1999). Some of his seldom read chapters include
argumentation on economic nature of religious practices. He argued that
self-interest is the true motivation behind the clergy, just as it is among
the secular producers. Similarly, market forces constrain churches just as
they constrain secular ￿rms and the bene￿ts of competition, the burdens of
monopoly and the hazards of government regulation are as real for religion
as for any other sector of the economy (Smith 1776, modern version 1965,
book V, chapt.I). Smith analyzes religious questions more intensively in his
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1759, modern version 1984), where he
states the economic and sociological importance of the consolation and eth-
ical motivation provided by belief in a righteous and omnipotent judge and
the concept of eternal life1.
According to Weber (Weber 1904, engl. 1930), economic development
leads to the secularization, not only of individuals, but also of political and
social institutions, including churches themselves. Church services would be
predicted to become less demanding, for example, by abandoning the use of
special religious language, requiring smaller outlays of time by participants,
reducing elaborate rituals and requiring less stringent practices. At the same
time, religious sects tend to become more like the established denominations.
The presence of an established state church, monopoly in religion, would
restrict the religious innovation in society, according to A. Smith. The
monopoly providers of religious services tend to become non-innovative, as
they lack the connection between ￿nancial support and the provision of good
service to religious customers. Instead of focusing on the religious needs of
their congregants, the clergy tend to engage in secular activities, politics, arts
and to intellectual learning, making clergy an elite group, o￿ering services
1for an extensive survey on the subject, see Minowitz, P. 1993. Pro￿ts, Priests and
Princes. Adam Smith’s Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion. Stanford,
CA. Stanford University Press
2only to other elite groups. On the other hand, the absence of state religion
would create a climate for competition among religion providers and forming
an open religious market, leading to moderation and quality religious services.
Greater religious pluralism would also encourage more religious participation.
One important argument against that A. Smith’s view is that state religion
status would mean government subsidies to church, which would encourage
formal religious activity. Therefore, the overall impact of monopoly religion
on religious participation could also be positive.
The relationship between economical and religious aspects of the soci-
ety is most probably two-way directional. On one side, a country’s economic
development a￿ect its level of religiosity. According to secularization hypoth-
esis, economic and scienti￿c development should cause individuals to become
less religious, encompassing also the idea that economic development gives
organized religions smaller role in political decision-making and in social and
legal processes of the society and that state churches will be abandoned as
countries develop. Increasing level of education makes individuals less re-
ligious and more skeptical on faith-based claims. The same argumentation
leads to notion that membership in deviant religious groups (sects, cults,
etc.) is the consequence of indoctrination leading to aberrant values, or ab-
normal psychology due to trauma, neurosis or unmet needs. That kind of
argumentation is still common, even when decades of research has repeatedly
proved them false (Iannaccone 1998, pp.1468-1472).
Economic development brings also increase in education, life expectancy,
urbanization, changes in age structure and fertility, all a￿ecting also religious
needs of the population. If religious beliefs are mainly based on ignorance,
then education should decrease the level of church attendance and religious
beliefs. Barro and McCleary (2002, p.2) give a contrary argument, which
states that religious beliefs are fundamentally non-veri￿able and therefore
require a considerable degree of abstraction. Theoretical reasoning and sci-
enti￿c activity requires also a capacity for abstraction. If more educated
individuals are more capable of the abstractions needed to think scienti￿-
3cally, then at the same time, they will be more able to make the abstractions
needed to support religious beliefs. Another explanation would be that edu-
cation increases the returns from networks and other forms of social capital.
According to this argumentation, more educated humans would participate
more in various group activities, including church services. Nevertheless, this
view does not say anything on belief formation.
Economic reasoning implies that anything that raises the cost of religious
activities would reduce these actions. As economic development raises the
value of time, it implies a rising opportunity cost of participating in religious
activities, church attendance and prayer. Enhanced productivity in econ-
omy is not accompanied by a similar productivity gain for the time spent in
church, unless the improvements in human capital due to rising education
would somehow also make the time spent in religion correspondingly more
productive.
In this paper, the contemporary research activity of economic science
concerning the religious activity and beliefs is presented and summarized.
The ￿rst step in economic science was to use the framework of classical mi-
croeconomic theory on consumer utility maximization by appending religious
variables into theoretical model. This has currently lead into more advanced
analysis including the scrutiny on religious institutions, religious markets and
the accumulation of social capital.
2 Religious production function of a household
Economics of religion did not emerge after A. Smith for until Azzi and Ehren-
berg (1975) returned the subject into economic science agenda. Their house-
hold production function included religious activity. Viewing religious behav-
ior as an instance of rational choice, rather than an exception to it, modern
economists are again analyzing religious behavior at the individual, group
and market level. In the model by Azzi and Ehrenberg, individuals allocate
their time and goods among religious and secular commodities by maximiz-
4ing lifetime and after-life utility (Azzi & Ehrenberg 1975). The main aim in
religious participation is ￿after-life consumption￿. Households are assumed to
maximize an intertemporal utility function which depends upon household’s
consumption Ct in period t and expected value of the household’s after-life
consumption A. Household members are assumed to die at the end of period
n:
U = U(C1;C2;:::;Ct;:::;Cn; A) (1)
The household religious participation model assumes three motives for
church-related activities. First is the salvation motive, as consumers may
view their expected after-life consumption as being related to their religious
participation. Second, consumption motive, implies that they may derive
current satisfaction from church membership and activities because of inher-
ent religious beliefs or purely social reasons. Third, social-pressure motive,
is derived from the assumption that church membership and participation
will increase the probability of an individual’s succeeding in business. That
motive will probably be important in areas where only a few established
churches exist, especially in the rural areas and for the new entrants to these
communities. Consumption (secular) in each period depends upon household
inputs of time TCt and purchased goods XCt. After-life compensation depend
on the household’s entire history of religious activities, R1;:::;Rn, which in
turn depend on the time TRt and consumption value of religious participa-
tion XRt in period t. Variable A implies mainly the salvation motive and
XRt deals with the consumption motive.
Ct = C(TCt;XCt) (2)
Rt = R(TRt;XRt) (3)
A = A(R1;:::;Rn) (4)
Azzi and Ehrenberg combined this model with a standard life-cycle bud-
get constraint and the assumption of non-decreasing marginal product of
5religious activity in time. According to this model, religious activity should
increase with age, because resources devoted to after-life salvation are as-
sumed not to accumulate interest throughout the life-cycle as usual invest-
ments do. Similarly, for a given age, the prediction is that religiousness would
be higher the lower is one’s life expectancy. This depends on the belief that
salvation depends on cumulated religious e￿ort, including church attendance
and prayer, during one’s lifetime. In this case, because of discounting of
future expenditures, it would be optimal to postpone outlays until later in
life. The arguments about age and life expectancy are stronger if salvation
relates especially to activities towards the end of life (as in Catholic dogma,
which allows continual sinning and absolution). Optimally, individuals have
an incentive to accumulate sins early in life and then make up for them as
they get closer to death. In Protestantism, especially in Calvinism, that ar-
gumentation does not hold. They view daily moral conduct as an important
sign of being a ￿true￿ Christian. Additionally, the model predicts stronger
age e￿ects for women, whose age-earnings pro￿les tend to be ￿atter than
men’s and the possibility of declining religious activity at young ages when
wages rise most rapidly. Any factor which increases the current satisfaction
which the household receives from participating in religious activities should
lead to an increase in the time it allocates to church activities. Religious
participation should be higher in rural areas, as the social values of religious
activities are probably higher there.
According to the same argumentation, racial discrimination may also led
to higher non-white religious participation. The model also predicts substi-
tution between time and money devoted to religion. The standard e￿ciency
conditions imply that households with lower values of time will produce reli-
gious commodities in a more time-intensive manner, and that members with
lower wages will supply more time to religious activity, as women usually
do. Especially white male population, who have sharp earnings increase dur-
ing their early adulthood, the age-religious-participation pro￿le may be U
shaped. Women’s age-attendance pro￿les will be steeper than men’s. On
6the other hand, introduction of an uncertain time of death into the model,
leads to the possibility of declining age-religious-participation pro￿les for the
aged. Azzi and Ehrenberg did also experiment models with n as a random
variable, but were unable to derive any implications from those alternatives.
It is important to make a distinction between religious beliefs and prac-
tice, as suggested by Keely (2003, p.284). Montgomery (1996) notes that
the interpretation of that kind of religious consumption framework is prob-
lematic in relation to the treatment of belief formation. He argues that it
is unclear whether religious capital is a proxy for utilities or probabilities
(or both). This notion is relevant, because contemporary economic theory
admits that utilities are generally taken to be personal and individualistic
in a way that probabilities are not, both used as asymmetric information
in expected utility maximization optimization process. Religious preferences
are usually associated with the utilities and religious beliefs with the prob-
abilities. Therefore, economists studying religious behavior need to spec-
ify more clearly the process by which both utilities and beliefs are formed
(Montgomery 1996, p.444). Montgomery o￿ers alternative approach, which
he calls methodological existentialism. That idea contains the notion that
ultimate reality is unknowable, and further that individuals are compelled
to make choices in the face of this uncertainty, even though they lack the
information needed to form objective beliefs. This argumentation leads to
the cognitive dissonance theory, which says that a state of tension occurs
when people simultaneously hold two psychologically inconsistent cognitions
(ideas, attitudes, beliefs), and therefore they try to decrease the tension by
altering cognitions or adding new cognitions.
Empirical testing of Azzi and Ehrenberg model has produced mixed re-
sults2. Nevertheless, empirical analysis support the notion that opportunity
cost of time a￿ects the religious behavior and leads to variation in both the
2Follow-up stydy by Ehrenberg (1977) con￿rms predictions, same with Neuman,
S.(1986). Nevertheless, Ulbrich and Wallace (1983,1984), nor Sullivan, D.(1985) do not
support the predictions of the model, especially criticizing the U-shaped age pro￿le as-
sumption
7level and time intensity of religious activity (Iannaccone 1998). As wages
increase, religious participation becomes more money-intensive, with rates
of church contributions rising relative to rates of church attendance. This
pattern holds over the life cycle, across households and denominations. De-
nominations with high earning members, rely strongly on the services of
professional church employees, require less time-consuming rituals and hold
fewer and shorter meetings. Most empirical analysis does not support the
prediction that di￿erent values of time explain the large gap between male
and female rates of religious activity, and the role of after-life expectations
and interest rate formation are unclear when explaining religious age trends.
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) model was the ￿rst formal model of religious
participation and a foundation for subsequent economic models of religion.
Since, the original model has been expanded in various ways. They emphasize
a wide range of rewards to religious activity, as a sense of purpose, moral
instruction, group identity, social support, status and mutual aid. Goods-
time production framework is also appended to include information from
family background, personal belief and denomination. At the same time,
importance of after-life consumption is diminished.
One important extension is the concept of religious human capital, appre-
ciated as SR, following Iannaccone (1998). Religious human capital indexes
the stock of religion-speci￿c experience derived from one’s past religious ac-
tivities. Consumer’s capacity to produce or appreciate religious commodities
will depend not only upon their inputs of time and goods, but also upon reli-
gious knowledge, familiarity with religious dogma and social relations within
the congregation. Most religious capital is quite speci￿c, related only to one
speci￿c denomination. It is also important, that most religious experience
and training is received directly from parents and from speci￿c religious in-
stitutions. The amount of religious human capital increases with learning by
doing and by religious consumption.
¢SRt = F(TRt¡1;XRt¡1;SRt¡1) (5)
8The religious production function (appending the original model with
equation 3) is thus:
Rt = R(TRt;XRt;SRt) (6)
This extension leads to a model of religious habit formation, where reli-
gious participation grows over time due to religious ￿addiction￿ rather than
after-life expectations.
This model produces three main implications. First, as children grow
older they reverse toward their parents beliefs and denominations. This
means harsh restrictions for religion switching and those restrictions are
stronger the more distinctive are the religions. Second, if religious switching
occurs, it probably happens during the early phases of the life cycle. Over
time, the gains from switching diminish. This is due to accumulation of de-
nomination speci￿c religious capital (which would be lost when switching)
and decrease of remaining living years for improvement capitalizing. Third,
people tend to marry within their own religion. Intermarrying consumers
have a strong incentive to adopt the religion of their spouse.
3 Religious institutions
Contemporary scrutiny on economics of religion is increasingly analyzing the
religious groups and institutions. Religious behavior is very much dependent
on the social context. In household’s religious production function models,
all religious production is assumed to occur at the level of individuals and
households. Institutional model underline the importance of specialized ￿rms
or clubs in the production of religious commodities. This line of research is di-
vided into two group. The ￿rst view churches as standard, neoclassical ￿rms
in which producers (priestly) sell their religious goods and services to (lay)
customers. The second view is to see churches as clubs, which are dedicated
to the collective production of worship services, religious instruction, social
activities and other club services. In these club models, the most members
9contribute both to production and consumption of the religious commodities.
3.1 Club models
In these models, religious commodities depend also upon the inputs of fellow
church members3. This means, that pleasure gained from religious activity
depends for example also on how many other people attend the meeting, their
greetings, their ability to sing, and others commitment, etc. Household’s
religious production function becomes:
Rt = R(TRt;XRt;SRt; Q) (7)
In the function, Q indexes the quality of the group, which is a function
of the religious inputs of the other group members, implying the average
amount of time that other members spend doing R. For i = 1:::n members







On the contrary to the traditional economic club models, this model
emphasizes the positive externalities associated with religious activity. An
active church member increases also the utility of other members and free-
riders decrease it. In clubs the actions of other members appear in each
3examples of religious club models include: Iannaccone (1992). Sacri￿ce and Stigma:
Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes and Other Collectives. J. of Political Economy,
100:2, pp.271-297;
Carr, J. and Landa, J. (1983). The Economics of Symbols, Clan names, and Religion. J.
Legal Studies, 12:1, pp.135-156;
Chiswick, B. (1991). An Economic Analysis of Philanthropy. In Contemporary Jewish
Philanthropy in America. Kosmin B.A. and Ritterband, P.(eds.) Rowman & Little￿eld;
Sullivan (1985). Simultaneous Determination of Church Contributions and Church Atten-
dance. Econ. Inquiry, 23:2, pp.309-320;
Wallis, J. (1990). Modelling Churches as Collective Action Groups. Int. J. Social Eco-
nomics, 17:1, pp.59-72
10other’s objective functions but externalities ￿owing from those actions are
excludable, applying only to club members. For inducing higher levels of
participation and screening out free-riders, sacri￿ces are included. Members
bene￿t from the religious and social activity of other club members through
a process not mediated by prices. Nevertheless, bene￿ts have a price, as
an e￿cient club seeks to in￿uence the activities of members by requiring
them to submit to prohibitions and sacri￿ces. This explains why rational
humans may want to participate in sects which demand self-sacri￿ce and
employ strict restrictions on the lifestyle of the members. On the other
hand, individuals with high market opportunities, may form less demanding
mainstream churches.
As presented by E. Berman (2000) the social welfare optimum level of







,where the two terms are the marginal rates of substitution between reli-
gious activity and consumption and between group quality and consumption.
The pure competitive equilibrium ignores the last term, and thus leads to
ine￿ciency.
The model predicts that sectarian religion correlates with strict behavioral
standards, high rates of church attendance and giving, small congregations,
dramatic conversations and a relatively large number of minority and lower-
class members (Iannaccone 1998, p.1483). Sects cannot exploit economies of
scale as fully as mainstream churches, because the monitoring costs increase
with group size. Sect membership is more attractive to individuals with lim-
ited secular opportunities, as sects impose high costs on high-earning people.
Sect membership forms a corner solution with no room for compromise and
assumes total abstinence from several secular commodities.
According to this club model view, a church can be seen as maximizing
the welfare of its members. Church is seen as an heterogenous club that
pursues enlargement within a set of constraints. The members of the clergy
11are agents of the club. The need to align the interests of the clergy with
those of the church, constraints the growth of the church. A church is seen
as caring for the welfare of its members, but not necessarily of its agents.
Therefore, contributions to the church must be used to monitor and limit
the discretion of the clergy (Barros & Garoupa 2001).
E. Berman (1999) has analyzed the economic rationality of Israeli Ultra-
Orthodox Jews, as they choose to live below the line of economic poverty
and accept harsh economic and behavioral sacri￿ces from the sect. The club
model enables the analysis of mutual insurance, state subsidies, economically
e￿cient level of sacri￿ce and religious politics. State support of a particu-
lar religious group introduces inequalities that generate ine￿ciencies of two
types. First, subsidizing groups that use sacri￿ces as signals of commitment
cause increased sacri￿ce. Second, restriction on the entry of providers of
religious services results in under-provision of services.
One extension of club model is a dynamic, overlapping generations model4,
which explains the tendency for new religions to originate as high-cost sects
but evolve over time into less demanding churches. Individual’s utilities de-
pend on their endowments of religious human capital and secular human
capital, which yields higher payo￿s in nonsectarian groups. The children of
the sect members switch to looser groups or pressure the sect to moderate
its costly demands as their wage level increases.
In club models, more free riding is expected in larger churches. Sev-
eral studies5 reveal a negative relationship between congregational size and
per-member rates of annual giving. Additional work is especially needed to
4Montgomery, J.D. 1996. Dynamics of the Religious Economy. Exit, Voice and De-
nominational Secularization. Rationality and Society, 8:1, pp.81-110
5Sullivan (1985);
Stonebraker, R.(1993). Optimal Church Size. The Bigger the Better? J. Scienti￿c Study
of Religion, 32:3, pp.231-241;
Zaleski, P. and Zech, C.(1994). Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protes-
tant Religious Giving. Review of Religious Research, 36:2, pp.158-167;
Lipford (1995). Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis. An examination of new evi-
dence from Churches. Public Choice, 83:3-4, pp.291-303
12address the endogeneity of size, speci￿cally the selection bias that occurs
if large, poorly ￿nanced congregations shrink more readily than large well-
￿nanced congregations.
3.2 Firm models
Some religious production functions assume churches as pro￿t-maximizing
￿rms and focus the attention to the di￿erent roles of clergy and lay people.
For analyzing the development of religious doctrine, organizational structure
and religious practice, standard neoclassical theory can be applied. Research
is done for analyzing individual entrepreneurship in the formation of new
religions6 and using franchising context in church growth analysis7. Economic
explanations can be addressed to interest rate restrictions, marriage laws,
crusades, monasteries and doctrines of heaven, hell and purgatory, by using
standard economic theories of monopoly, rent seeking and transaction costs8.
That way of providing economic rationales for religious practices leads to
economic theorizing about the content of a religion. Economists can formally
model the religious doctrines and arrive at empirically testable predictions.
A church can be seen as a business ￿rm that maximizes pro￿ts, for exam-
ple (Barros & Garoupa 2001, p.5), analyzing Roman Catholic church as a
corporation aiming at monopolizing the religious market by regulating social
norms (sin and redemption), eliminating competition (Crusades) or control-
ling usury and exchange doctrines, scienti￿c innovations or the marriage
market.
The topics in that area include economics of medieval catholic church9,
6Stark and Bainbridge (1985). The Future of Religion. Berkeley, UC Press
7Dolin, R., Slesnick, F. and Byrd, J. (1989). The Organizational Structures of Church
and Orthodoxy. West Econ. Association, Lake Tahoe, NV
8Ekelund, R.B. et al (1996). Sacred Trust. The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm.
New York, Oxford University Press
9Hull (1989). Religion, Afterlife and Property Rights in the High Middle Ages. Stud.
Econ. Anal., 12:1, pp.3-21;
Schmidtchen, D. and Mayer, A. (1997). Established Clergy, Friars and the Pope. Some
13Calvinist doctrine of predestination10, emergence of Judaic monotheism11,
distinctive character of religious texts12, cross-cultural and intertemporal
variation in beliefs on the after-life13 and the relationship between di￿erent
styles of religious organization14.
3.3 Religious markets
Churches, seen as religious ￿rms, all together constitute a religious market.
According to A. Smith (Smith 1776, modern version 1965, pp.740-741), es-
tablished religions face the same incentive problems that plague other state-
sponsored monopolies. Studies for religious competition note that local re-
ligious diversity correlates with local rates of religious participation. Ac-
cording to Smith, free religious competition would not only generate more
religious activity, but also produce higher quality religious services. Reli-
gious laissez-faire is the best and most e￿cient way to satisfy the demand
for religious instruction, reduce religious con￿ict and promote high quality
religious activity.15 Iannaccone (1998) has calculated the Her￿ndahl index,
which measures country’s religious concentration. It is denoted as §iS2
ij,
where Sij implies the share of people in country j belonging to denomination
i. He found the strong negative relationship between the index and church
attendance (Iannaccone 1998, p.1486), and that every available measure of
Institutional Economics of the Medieval Church. J. Instit. & Theor. Economics, 153:1,
pp.122-149.
10Glaeser (1994). Incentive, Predestination and free will. Mimeo
11Raskovitch (1996). You shall have no other Gods besides Me. J. Instit. & Theor.
Economics, 152:3, pp.449-471
12Miller, G. (1994). The Legal-Economic Approach to Biblical Interpretation. J. Instit.
& Theor. Economics, 150:4, pp.755-762
13Hull and Bold (1994). Hell, Religion and Cultural Change. J. Instit. & Theor.
Economics, 150:3, pp.447-464
14Allen, D. (1995). Order in the Church. A property rights approach. J. Econ. Behav.
Organization, 27:1, pp.97-117
15Adam Smith’s view was contrary to David Hume’s, who predicted that religious free-
dom would encourage fanaticism, superstition and civil unrest.
14piety (belief in God, frequency of prayer, etc.) was greater in countries with
numerous competing churches than in countries dominated by a single es-
tablished church. Within each country, the average level of religious belief
and participation was consistently lower in the established churches, which
enjoy the ￿nancial and regulatory support of the state. Increasing religious
freedom and the removal of monopolistic state-church status has given a way
to free religious market, leading to increase in overall church membership and
religious activity, but making also losers. Major denominations that origi-
nally enjoyed state support have su￿ered severe losses relative to new sects.
The abolition of state religion (Shinto) in Japan after the 2nd World War,
gave birth to 2,000 new religious sects in ￿ve years. Democratic regimes seem
more likely to arise and survive within Protestant Christian cultures. Gov-
ernment regulation of religion tends to reduce individual welfare, restricting
religious innovation and choice, and narrowing the range of religious com-
modities. State religion promotes monopoly, poor service and low rates of
church attendance16.
Nevertheless, Barro and McCleary (2002, p.27) found the signi￿cant pos-
itive relation with state religion and church attendance. Their explanation
was that state religion typically goes along with substantial state subsidy.
An established state religion will help to maintain a low degree of religious
pluralism. While Scandinavian countries are examples of state churches with
low rates of church attendance, Barro and McCleary note that low atten-
dance depends also on other variables, not just on state religion status. The
other system variables, the overall in￿uence of the economic variables and
the composition of religious denominations, tend also generate low rates of
16similar results are also found in: Stark and Bainbridge (1997). Religion, Deviance and
Social Control. New York, Routledge;
Iannaccone (1991). The Consequences of Religious Market Structure. Adam Smith and
the Economics of Religion. Rationality & Society, 3:2, pp.156-177;
Finke and Stark (1992). The Churching of America, 1776-1990. Winners and Losers in
our Religious Economy. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers U Press;
Finke and Iannaccone (1993)
15church attendance. Relationship is also signi￿cantly positive for religious be-
liefs, implying that the state sponsorship that encourages church attendance
is also successful in engendering high levels of beliefs.
Not surprisingly, government regulation of religion and Communist regime
(which are interconnected) depresses church attendance and some of the re-
ligious beliefs. But after the downfall of the Communist regimes in Eastern
Europe, the church attendance and beliefs recovered during the 1990s. Sup-
porting the ￿ndings of Iannaccone (1998), also Barro and McCleary (2002)
found signi￿cantly positive relation between religious pluralism in the coun-
try and religious activity. The pattern was clear for both church attendance
and some beliefs (hell and heaven). This phenomena accords with the argu-
ment from the religion-market model that greater pluralism will encourage
competition among religion providers and lead to better service and higher
rates of attendance.
Barros and Garoupa (2001) analyzed church dogma development and
the relationship between religious strictness and membership. Applying the
Hotelling (1929) model of horizontal product di￿erentiation, they argue that
neoclassical ￿rm theory can be of relevance in understanding church’s choice
of strictness and its optimal dogmatic response depending on the competitive
environment (monopoly, non-church option, emergence of sects, etc.). The
church’s choice depends on the preferences of the population, the value of the
religious good it produces (a local public good) and existence of a rival church,
a sect or a non-church. A sect behaves like a Stackelberg follower. With re-
ligious freedom, meaning that people have the option of not belonging to a
church, the main church becomes less conservative in their views in order to
prevent some people from leaving the church. In high participation countries
(Spain, Italy), the church can a￿ord to be conservative, whereas when there
is low participation the church must become liberal. In multi-denominational
economies where the main church competes with another church, the main
church is expected to be fairy liberal (as in Scandinavia) and in countries
where the dominant church competes with sects, the main church is tending
16to be more conservative (in the US). If some individuals change preferences
by softening their religious strictness the monopolistic church becomes more
liberal to keep them inside the church. Such move opens room for con-
servative entries in the market and the number of denominations available
may increase. The potential entry of sects induces an incumbent church to
become more conservative whereas the possibility of opting no religious a￿l-
iation has more ambiguous e￿ect, the church may become liberal to compete
with non-church or it may become more conservative since the liberals leave
the church.
4 Empirical evidence
Over the past 40 years empirical relationship between income, education,
urbanization, age structure and numerous measures of religiosity have been
investigated17. Since the mid-1970s economists have also weighted in, esti-
mating models which are more sensitive to ￿non-market￿ variables of eco-
nomic theory. The main result seems to be that education is a weak but
generally positive predictor of religious participation; income is a strong,
positive predictor of religious contributions, but a very weak predictor of
most other other measures of religious activity, such as church attendance,
church membership, frequency of prayer and rates of religious belief. In-
come or wage e￿ects are almost always dwarfed by those of age, gender and
religious upbringing18.
17Lenski, G.E.(1963). The Religious Factor. Rev.ed. Garden City, NY, Doubleday;
Stark, (1972). The Economics of Piety. Religious Commitment and Social Class. In:
Issues in Social Inequality. Thielbar, G.W and Feldman, S.D. eds. Boston, pp.483-503;
Roof, W. and McKinney, W. (1987). American Mainline Religion. Its changing shape and
future. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers U Press;
Stolzenberg, R. Bair-Loy, M. and Waite, L. (1995). Religious Participation in Early Adult-
hood. Age and family life cycle e￿ects on Church membership. American Soc. Review,
60:1, pp.84-103
18see Azzi and Ehrenberg, (1975);
Ehrenberg, (1977). Household Allocation of Time and Religiosity. Replication and Exten-
17Nevertheless, it seems at the same time that styles of religion do vary
with income and education. Theologically conservative denominations (fun-
damentalist, Pentecostal, sectarian) seem to attain a disproportionate share
of their members from among the poorer, less educated fractions of society.
Iannaccone (1998) notes that family income has little e￿ect on rates of
church attendance but a strong positive e￿ect on total giving. E￿ect of
education is positive and statistically signi￿cant. Women and blacks attend
church more than men and whites. Members of conservative and sectarian
denominations attend religious activities more than other groups and give
more money contributions to church than in liberal denominations. Age
seems to be an especially strong predictor of church attendance. Older people
are more religious. Analysis by Heineck (2001), supports the strong age e￿ect,
as age had a positive impact on church attendance and strength of belief for
both women and men (using German data). This supports the notion of
both the assumption of the addictive character of religion and the decreasing
opportunity costs of time alongside the ￿attening wage pro￿le on the upper
end of the age scale. Nevertheless, despite these signi￿cant e￿ects, observable
factors account for only a small fraction of the total variance in data.
Aging and illness makes attending church services more di￿cult and ex-
pensive, but may produce more interest into religious beliefs and investing
into spiritual activity, as they note the death getting closer. Children, on
the other hand, would tend to attend church relatively often because their
cost of attendance are relatively low. Also parents may encourage (or dis-
sion. J. Political Economy, 85:2, pp.415-423;
Long, S. and Settle, R. (1977). Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance.
Some Additional Evidence. J. Political Economy, 85:2, pp.409-413;
Ulbrich, H. and Wallace, M. (1983). Church Attendance, Age and Belief in the Afterlife.
Some additional evidence. Atlantic Econ. J., 11:2, pp.44-51,
Ulbrich, H. and Wallace, M. (1984). Women’s Work Force Status and Church Attendance.
J. Scienti￿c Study of Religion, 23:4, pp.341-350;
Biddle, J.E. (1992). Religious Organizations, in: Who Bene￿ts from the Nonpro￿t Sector?
Clotfelder, C.T. (ed.), U Chicago Press, pp.92-133
18courage) religious education of the children and may also be participate in
church activities.
Another clear ￿nding is that urbanization a￿ects negatively the religious
activity. Church services have little competition from other forms of social
interaction in rural areas. This negative association would be expected to
carry over to religious beliefs if participation in organized services were con-
ductive to the maintenance of these beliefs. One explanation could also be
that the uncertainty of economic conditions, and therefore the demand for
religious assistance, is larger in rural areas. Another reason may be that
agriculture is especially prone to the uncertainties of nature and rural pop-
ulation may therefore have a greater demand for religion as a way to cope
with these uncertainties and risks.
Barro and McCleary (2002) analyzed also the phenomenon of supersti-
tions. According to the secularization hypothesis, increased education would
produce less religious activity and religious beliefs. As found, that hypothe-
sis is not supported by empirical data, but the hypothesis may gain support
if clear superstition beliefs are analyzed. ISSP (International Social Sur-
vey Programme) survey data contains three such variables, belief in fortune
tellers, horoscopes and good-luck charms. According to study by Barro and
McCleary, these variables have a negative correlation with religious activi-
ties and beliefs, implying that religious beliefs and superstitious notions are
very di￿erent. One possible explanation is that religious beliefs are compat-
ible with increased education, but superstitious beliefs are not. However,
another possibility is that the superstitions tend to substitute for religious
beliefs and activities in societies where standard religious practices are not
fully allowed, as superstition seems to be the highest in former Communist
countries.
195 Conclusion
More research on economics of religion are needed in analyzing the substance
of religion, not just taking the demand for religion as given, but providing
insight into the di￿erence in nature between a congregation and any other so-
cial group, or the di￿erence between religious activity and other leisure. More
￿supernatural￿ commodities are needed (like after-life in Azzi and Ehrenberg
(1975) model) to better understand the nature of consumers behavior, values
and religion. One distinctive nature of religious goods are that they involve
a large amount of risk. Religion is the ultimate credence good, rewards may
never materialize and failures may be in￿nite. This religious uncertainty and
risk-taking should be better modelled. Expected utility models might seem
like the natural beginning. Nevertheless, objective religious information may
simply not exist, leaving no rational way to assign probabilities to most re-
ligious claims (Montgomery 1996). Economics of religion should analyze the
formation of beliefs and give more attention to the process by which reli-
gions seek to shape people’s beliefs and values. One alternative, as Keely
suggests (Keely 2003), is that economics of religion should focus more on
religious institutions, rather than religious beliefs, in order to work toward
policy prescriptions to improve countries’ economic performance.
Religion seems to be the ideal testing ground for several economic theory
issues. These issues include models of value change and belief formation.
Religions are both forthright and speci￿c about the beliefs and values they
seek to inculcate, making it relatively easy to estimate their impact through
surveys and observations. One of the most promising aspect in economics of
religion is the fact that religious beliefs and behavior have been documented
over many years and across di￿erent cultures. Much more is known about
the membership, ￿nances and history of churches and denominations than
any other type of social organization, making the subject fruitful to empirical
econometricians.
The need for scienti￿c analysis of di￿cult moral and religious questions
is increasing all the time. Continuing technical, bio-technical and medical
20science development raises new problematic issues, requiring careful analy-
sis also from an economic perspective. For example, problems with human
cloning (Gilles 2003), are well suited for scrutiny by using economic methods
and argumentation.
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